Ambiguity, Kruks is caref ul to point out, is not necessarily a strict negative indicative of f ault; rather, it is to be seen as a "quality of phenomena themselves, signif ying their indeterminacy" and, most importantly f or Beauvoir, is used "to denote relationships in which antithetical qualities coexist in agonistic tension" (p.6-7). T he ambiguity most particularly relevant in political action and thought is, in Beauvoir's words, "the strange ambiguity of existence made body" (p.7), which becomes manif est in the vaporous but undeniable boundaries between self and society, and the various means by which a self and its actions acquire meaning.
T his ambiguity is irresolvable f or the very simple reason that we are not the sovereign, autonomous consciousnesses theorized by Enlightenment-era humanists; as such, the f irst and most prof ound point on which Beauvoir (through Kruks) insists, is that we come to terms with the ambiguities and tensions intrinsic to all action (and inaction). It is towards this end that Kruks mines Beauvoir's work f or examples of how these ambiguities play out and what meaning they acquire in the political realm.
Let's look at a specif ic political action: suf f ragette Emily Davison throws herself under King George V's horse in 1913. T his action could be legitimately interpreted as one of rebellion, def iance, accidental death, terrorism, suicide, martyrdom, and no doubt arguments could be made f or any number of other interpretations. Anyone f amiliar with G. K. Chesterton's Orthodoxy has heard the argument f or suicide and martyrdom being as polar opposites, and that two such radically dif f erent interpretations are readily applicable to Emily Davison's political action is a strong indication that Beauvoir's insistence on the inevitability of f ailure is not uncalled f or. Add consideration of Ms. Davison's intentions and the muddled soup of personal and collective concerns to the variety of possible interpretations and the ambiguity becomes increasingly multif aceted, and clearly a necessary aspect of any action.
T his does not make Beauvoir a f eather in the cap of hard-core relativists, by any stretch. Rather, despite her scorn f or "intransigent moralists" and "moral purists," Beauvoir considers political "realists" to be an equally shady example of "bad f aith" -of wilf ul ignorance or self -deception, in this case of too readily accepting and absolving themselves of the consequences of a "realistic" lesser evil. Kruks writes: "this does not mean that action should not be guided by values. T hat existence is ambiguous does not mean that it is absurd or meaningless but rather that 'its meaning is never f ixed, that it must be unceasingly won'. T hus, values must f unction as heuristics, as guidelines […] rather than as commands to be f ollowed blindly" (p.42). Beauvoir of f ers f reedom as guidance f or action, albeit one that neither dictates action (or inaction) nor "justif [ies] the injuries that a politics oriented towards expanding f reedom may produce" (ibid).
While the reader may, at this point, be understandably f rustrated, a thread running throughout the book provides an important indicator of the quality of this 'f reedom'. T his recurring theme is that of mutual recognition between individuals of others' embodied subjectivity, and can be f ollowed through her analysis of Beauvoir's discussions of modes of dehumanization and oppression in the second chapter ("T heorizing Oppression"), through the dif f icult acknowledgment of "the impossibility of eliminating alterity and objectif ication f rom human relations" even when one is, in good f aith, doing one's best to f ulf il the obligation to struggle against oppressive/dehumanizing practices (discussed most explicitly in the third chapter, "Conf ronting Privilege").
T his thread re-emerges in the f ourth chapter, "Dilemmas of Political Judgement," as Kruks, through Beauvoir, explores the implications of viewing judgments as "acts of situated f reedom" which "must exceed the application of principle" (p.125). She does so primarily through Henri Perron: the f ounder and editor of a lef t-leaning independent newspaper in Beauvoir's novel The Mandarins who f inds himself , af ter the war, f acing a series of dif f icult decisions with regard to his own f uture and the f uture of his newspaper. Caught between his desire to isolate himself f rom politics and resume his successf ul writing career (to become "the old Henri", a desire he ultimately realizes is impossible: the "old Henri" no longer exists), and his personal loyalty to his mentor and his broader loyalty to the Resistance, the judgements and decisions he makes are inf ormed by a very messy combination of emotions (tied both to personal hopes and ideals, and to interpersonal relationships) and emotionless practical "reasoning."
In the last chapter, "'An Eye f or an Eye': T he Question of Revenge", Kruks uses Beauvoir's discussion of three dif f erent types of revenge -the desire f or revenge on one's own behalf ; on behalf of others; and in the context of legal prosecution -to tease out the relationships between the subjectivities involved, with the ultimate assertion that revenge always "f ails to accomplish much of what is desired" (p.161).
T he book itself is organized very much with the student in mind, with each chapter titled (and very nearly treated) as a discrete entity; and while some readers may be tempted to do likewise, the progression of Kruks' argument throughout the book requires more holistic attention to avoid drawing incorrect or overly simplistic conclusions about Beauvoir's contribution.
Beauvoir, if presented with this volume, would f ind herself competently situated both historically and in political and f eminist theory. And she would f eel herself certainly among f riends: a great deal of ink is spilt def ending Beauvoir against a number of very specif ic criticisms, stemming mostly f rom second-wave f eminists. T his attention, while of course usef ul to a certain extent, nevertheless distracts f rom Kruks's much more interesting and original readings of Beauvoir's corpus.
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